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Accounting for and Disclosure of Special Purpose
Entities by Financial Holding Companies:
Lessons from PNC Financial Services
In 2001 PNC Financial Services Group (PNC),1 a financial
holding company (FHC),2 created three special purpose entities
(SPEs) to which it transferred some of its non-performing loans
and venture capital.3 SPEs are typically created by an asset
transferor or sponsor for a specific limited purpose, with a limited
life and limited activities to benefit a single company.4 PNC
intended to structure the SPE transactions in a way that the
financial records of the SPEs would not have to be consolidated
with PNC's financial reports under generally accepted accounting
principles5 (GAAP). 6 PNC's auditors at the time, Ernst & Young,7
1. PNC Financial Services Group provides a range of services from personal
banking to corporate finance and investment.
See PNC, About Us, at
http://www.pnc.com/aboutus/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
2. In order for a bank holding company (BHC) to be classified as a financial
holding company the BHC must make an effective election to become a financial
holding company. Bank Holding Companies Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1)(C) (Supp.
2002); Federal Reserve System Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
12 C.F.R. § 225.81(b)(3) (2002). Additionally, all depository institutions controlled
by the BHC must be and must remain well capitalized and well-managed. 12 U.S.C
§§ 1843(l)(1)(A)-(B); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.81(b)(1)-(2); see infra notes 50 and 59.
3. PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Enforcement Release No. 1597, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 75,112 at 63,481 (July 18, 2002).
4. Special Purpose Entities: Understanding the Guidelines, ISSUES ALERT (Fin.
Executives Int'l, Morristown, N.J.), Jan. 2002, at 1, http://www.fei.org/download/
SPEIssuesAlert.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2003) [hereinafter Guidelines for SPEs].
SPEs may be organized as a partnership, corporation, trust or joint venture. Id.
5. "Generally accepted accounting principles" is defined as
[a] technical accounting term that encompasses all the conventions,
rules and procedures necessary to define accepted accounting
practice at a particular time ....
GAAP includes accounting
principles and practices as well as the methods of applying them.
Generally accepted
accounting principles recognize the
importance of reporting transactions and events in accordance
with their substance.
DAN M. Guy & D.R. CARMICHAEL, WILEY PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO GAAS 2001
410 and 411 1 (2001).
The categories of GAAP, in rank order [for nongovernmental
entities], are as follows:
1. Accounting principles promulgated by bodies designated by the
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approved the off-balance-sheet treatment of the SPEs.8 The
Securities and Exchange, Commission (SEC), however, alleged
that PNC's accounting with respect to these transactions was

improper under GAAP and that PNC made materially false and
misleading disclosures in its quarterly filings and press releases
because the volatile loans and related losses were not consolidated

in PNC's financial statements, thus leading to an overstatement of
PNC's earnings.9 As a result of the SEC action, PNC had to
reduce its earnings for 2001 by $155 million when it was forced to
consolidate the SPEs onto its balance sheet and recognize the asset
losses."
Additionally, PNC's management rating may be
AICPA Council to establish such principles .... Those principles
are
* Financial
Accounting
Standards
Board
(FASB)
Statements of Financial Accounting
Standards and
Interpretations
" Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinions
•
AICPA Accounting Research Bulletins [(ARB)]
2. FASB Technical Bulletins and, if cleared by the FASB, AICPA
Industry Audit and Accounting Guides and AICPA Statements of
Position
3. AICPA Accounting Standards Executive Committee (AcSEC)
Practice Bulletins that have been cleared by the FASB and
consensus positions of the FASB Emerging Issues Task Force
(EITF).
4. AICPA Accounting Interpretations, Implementation Guides
(Qs and As) published by the FASB staff, and practices that are
widely recognized and prevalent either generally or in the industry.
5. Other accounting literature (nonauthoratative).
Id. at 410 and 411 • 3 to • 4. These pronouncements should be considered starting
with the highest level of authority, and working down toward the lowest level. Id. at
410 and 411 • 6.
6. Ken Berzof, U.S. accuses PNC bank of concealing bad loans; SEC says hidden
$762 million led to inflated profit, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), July 19, 2002,
at Al.
7. Id.
8. See Press Release, PNC Fin. Servs. Group, PNC Revises 2001 Financial
Results and Reaffirms 2002 Estimates (Jan. 29, 2002), http://www.prnewswire.com/
cgi-bin/micro-site.pl?Tick=PNC (on file with N.C. Banking Institute) (last visited
Feb. 15, 2003) [hereinafter PNC Press Release Announcing Revised 2001 Results].
9. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The Securities and Exchange
Commission Takes Enforcement Action with Respect to the PNC Financial Services
Group, Inc. Arising Out of PNC's Improper Accounting and Disclosures Regarding
the Transfer of $762 Million of Loans and Other Assets to Special Purpose Entities
(July 18, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-109.htm (on file with N.C.
Banking Institute) (last visited Feb. 15, 2003) [hereinafter SEC Press Release].
10. Patricia Sabatini, PNC Put Under 6-Month Watch; Agreement Ends
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downgraded because of the SEC action alleging that PNC did not
comply with GAAP." Since the passage of the Gramm Leach
Bliley Act (GLBA), the consequences of downgrading the
management rating are significant.' 2 If PNC does not correct the
management issues satisfactorily within the statutorily prescribed
time period, it may either have to divest its banking subsidiary, or
13
it may have to divest its businesses that are "financial in nature"'
so that it is no longer a FHC and, thus, does not have to maintain a
well-managed rating. 4
Financial institutions have been using SPEs for decades to
monetize loans and receivables on their balance sheets. 5 In light
of current developments, however, financial institutions need to
carefully scrutinize the way SPEs are structured to ensure that offbalance-sheet treatment of SPEs is in accordance with GAAP.16
Part I of this Note will examine how PNC's SPE
transactions were structured. 7 This Note will then examine
accounting for SPEs in Part 11. 8 Part III of this Note will examine
the Federal Reserve Board's (FRB) scrutiny of PNC's SPE
transactions."
Part IV of this Note will examine the SEC's
scrutiny of PNC's SPE transactions. 2' Finally, Part V of this Note
will examine the lessons that can be drawn from PNC's
21

Accounting Probe, Prrr. POST-GAZETTE, July 19, 2002, 2002 WL 21887007.
11. See Alissa Schmelkin & Rob Garver, In Focus: Regulators Put Clamps on
PNC; GLB status in doubt; FDIC premiums imposed; hiring, pay restricted, AM.
BANKER, July 19, 2002, at 1.
12. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
13. Bank Holding Companies Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (Supp. 2002); Federal
Reserve System Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 12 C.F.R. §
225.86 (2002).
14. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m)(4); 12 C.F.R. § 225.83(e).
15. Al L. Hartgraves & George J. Benston, The Evolving Accounting Standards
for Special Purpose Entities and Consolidations,16 AccT. HORIZONs 245, 246 (Sept.
2002).
16. See infra notes 79-106 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 22-36 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 50-78 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 79-106 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 107-135 and accompanying text.
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ENTITY TRANSACTIONS

PNC entered into three different transactions sponsored22
by an insurance company, American International Group, Inc.
(AIG),23 in the second, third and fourth quarters of 2001.24 In June
2001, AIG organized a SPE as a Delaware LLC (LLC I) through
its subsidiary and received Class B stocks of the newly formed
company.25 PNC contributed $365.8 million in cash through a nonbank subsidiary and received Class A preferred stock in
exchange.26 AIG's Class B common stock purported to give it
control over LLC I including the authority to decide whether to
declare dividends on PNC's Class A preferred stock.27
In its second quarter form 10-Q filing, 8 PNC did not
include the assets transferred to LLC I on its balance sheet but
included the Class A preferred stock as securities available for
sale. 29 The second quarter 10-Q did not provide any disclosure
concerning the LLC I transaction or recognize losses on $84
million in non-performing assets that PNC had transferred to LLC
1.30 Similarly, in its third quarter 10-Q and press release, PNC did
22. "Sponsor" is sometimes used to refer to the company that creates the SPE,
which may or may not be the primary beneficiary of the SPE. Hartgraves & Benston,
supra note 15, at 245 n.1.
23. Berzof, supra note 6, at Al.
24. See PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Enforcement Release No. 1597, 7 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 75,112 at 63,481 (July 18, 2002).
25. Id. at 63,482. AIG received $36,576 of LLC I's Class B common stock and
$11,558,940 of its Class B preferred stock in exchange for its cash contribution. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 63,483.
28. The SEC describes the Form 10-Q as
a report filed quarterly by most reporting companies. It includes
unaudited financial statements and provides a continuing view of
the company's financial position during the year. The report must
be filed for each of the first three fiscal quarters of the company's
fiscal year and is due within 45 days of the close of the quarter.
See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Description of SEC Forms, at http://www.sec.
gov/info/edgar/ forms.htm (last modified May, 29, 2001).
29. PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Enforcement Release No. 1597, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 75,112 at 63,484; see also PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Quarterly Report on Form
10-Q, Second Quarter 2001, ending June 30, 2001, at 7, at http://www.sec.
gov/Archives/edgar/data/713676/000095012801500466/0000950128-01-500466.txt
(last
visited Feb. 15, 2003) [hereinafter PNC's Second Quarter 10-Q Form].
30. PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Enforcement Release No. 1597, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 75,112 at 63,485; see also PNC's Second Quarter 10-Q Form, supra note 29
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not disclose its transactions with LLC I and LLC II, but noted a
decline in loans as a result of ongoing efforts to reduce lending
leverage. 3 ' PNC attributed this slide to a decline in commercial
32
loans to downsize certain high-risk, non-strategic portfolios.
On January 17, 2001, after being informed by the FRB that
non-consolidation of the assets transferred to the SPEs was
inappropriate for bank holding company (BHC) reporting, PNC
reported that it had reduced its institutional loan portfolio and
venture capital assets through, among other things, sales of these
assets to subsidiaries of a third party financial institution.33 The
press release tabulated PNC's nonperforming assets by type and
stated that the table did not include certain assets sold to
subsidiaries of a third party financial institution, but those assets
would be included in PNC's nonperforming assets in its BHC
(an analysis of the 10-Q Form shows that PNC did not disclose the LLC I
transaction).
31. See PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Enforcement Release No. 1597, 7 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 75,112 at 63,485; Press Release, PNC Fin. Servs. Group, The PNC
Financial Services Group Reports Third Quarter 2001 Earnings (Oct. 18, 2001),
(on file with N.C.
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/micro-site.pl?Tick=PNC
Banking Institute) (last visited Feb. 15, 2003) [hereinafter PNC Press Release
Announcing Third Quarter 2001 Earnings]; see also PNC Fin. Servs. Group,
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q, Third Quarter 2001, ending September 30, 2001,
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/713676/000095012801500710/0000950128-01500710.txt (last visited Feb. 15, 2003) [hereinafter PNC's Third Quarter 10-Q Form]
(an analysis of the Third Quarter 10-Q shows that PNC did not disclose its LLC
transactions, except to list them as securities available for sale). PNC did not include
the $207 million in nonperforming assets that were transferred to LLC I and II in its
total nonperforming assets in its press release or third quarter 10-Q. PNC Press
Release Announcing Third Quarter 2001 Earnings, supra. Neither the press release
nor the third quarter 10-Q mentioned the two LLC transactions that PNC had
engaged in. See id; see also PNC's Third Quarter 10-Q Form, supra. In September
and December 2001, PNC filed shelf registrations for certain securities with the SEC
which incorporated by reference the second and third quarter 10-Q forms. PNC Fin.
Servs. Group, Enforcement Release No. 1597, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $75,112 at
63,485 - 86; see also Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus dated Sept. 24, 2001, at S-6,
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/713676/0000950128-01-500643.txt (last visited
Feb. 15, 2003); Form S-8 Registration Statement under the Securities Act of 1933, at
(last
5, http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/713676/0000950128-01-500719.txt
visited Feb. 15, 2003).
32. See PNC Press Release Announcing Third Quarter 2001 Earnings, supra note

31.
33. See Press Release, PNC Fin. Servs. Group, The PNC Financial Services
Group Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2001 Results (Jan. 17, 2002),
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/micro site.pl?Tick=PNC (on file with N.C.
Banking Institute) (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
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regulatory filings.34 PNC disclosed the amounts of nonperforming
assets sold to the three, LLCs but did not consolidate the assets of
the three limited liability SPEs into PNC's financial statements or
set forth any reasons explaning why consolidation may be
appropriate for its bank regulatory filing but not for its SEC
filing.35 Finally, PNC did not disclose the impact of consolidation
on its 2001 earnings per share.36
II.

ACCOUNTING FOR SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES

Prior to the Enron debacle, many accountants were not
familiar with the accounting standards that guide the accounting
and financial reporting by companies who sponsor SPEs.37
Originally, SPEs were primarily used by banks and other
companies to monetize the substantial amounts of consumer
receivables on their balance sheet through off-balance-sheet
securitization.38
While SPEs are generally used for off-balance-sheet
securitization, GAAP requires certain SPEs to be included on the
balance sheet of the primary beneficiary of the transactions. 39 For
non-consolidation by the transferor to be appropriate, the majority
owner of the SPE must be an independent third-party who has
made a substantial capital investment in the SPE, has control of
the SPE, and has substantive risks and rewards of ownership of the
SPE's assets.4" The minimum amount acceptable under GAAP to

34. Id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Hartgraves & Benston, supra note 15, at 246.
38. Id.
39. Id. In 1990, EITF promulgated Topic No. D-14: "Transactions Involving
Special Purpose Entities." FIN. Accr. STANDARDS BD., EITF ABSTRACTS: A
SUMMARY OF PROCEDURES OF THE FASB EMERGING ISSUES TASK FORCE,

SEPTEMBER 7, 1990 4970 (1990) [hereinafter EITF ABSTRACTS]. In 1984 FASB's task
force on timely financial reporting guidance recommended the formation of the
EITF. Fin. Acct. Standards Bd., Emerging Issues Task Force General Information,at
http://www.fasb.org/eitf/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 15, 2003). EITF Topic No. D14 discusses whether certain SPEs should be consolidated despite the lack of majority

ownership, and whether transfers of assets to the SPE should be recognized as sales.
EITF ABSTRACTS, supra at 4970.
40. EITF ABSTRACTS, supra note 39, at 4970.
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show substantive capital investment is three percent."
Additionally, for some specified arrangements where assets and
liabilities are not reported on the balance sheet, information about
future obligations under the contracts must be disclosed in the
notes to the financial statement.42
Typically, a sponsor company creates the SPE to purchase
specific assets from the sponsor. 43 The sponsoring company could
then convert receivables into cash.44 A third-party contributes a
minimum three percent investment, representing a legal equity
ownership interest in the SPE.45 In exchange for its investment,
the third-party retains the substantial risks and benefits of its
ownership of the SPE.46 Generally, a two-step approach is taken
to determine whether an entity can be treated as an SPE under
GAAP.47 The first step is to identify the sponsor and the second is
to decide when SPEs should be consolidated on the financial
statements of the sponsor.48
PNC intended to structure its transaction with the LLCs as
transfers to SPEs, but the SEC held that the SPEs did not qualify
for off-balance-sheet treatment and that PNC should have
consolidated the SPEs onto its balance sheet.4 9
III.

THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD'S SCRUTINY OF PNC's
SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITY TRANSACTIONS

The FRB has supervisory and regulatory authority over
BHCs and those BHCs that have qualified as FHCs.5 ° The FRB
41. Hartgraves & Benston, supra note 15, at 252.
42. Id. at 247. One such example is the disclosure requirements in the case of
operating leases. Id.
43. Guidelinesfor SPEs, supra note 4, at 1.
44. Hartgraves & Benston, supra note 15, at 246.
45. Guidelines for SPEs, supra note 4, at 1. The fair value of the financial assets
to be sold determines the three percent threshold. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 2.

48. Id. The sponsor may not be easily determined because of the number of
parties involved in an SPE. Id.
49. See Berzof, supra note 6, at Al.
50. See FED. RES. SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES &
FUNCTIONS
71 (8th ed. 1994), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
pf/pdf/frspf5.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2003) [hereinafter PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS
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"works with other federal and state financial authorities to ensure
safety and soundness in the operation of financial institutions,
stability in the financial markets, and fair and equitable treatment
of consumers in their financial transactions."'" Bank regulators
assess the condition of financial organizations and their
compliance with laws and regulations by monitoring, inspecting,
and examining these organizations. 2 If a financial institution is
found to be in noncompliance, the FRB may use its supervisory
authority to take formal or informal action requiring the
institution to correct its problems.53
In 2000, PNC was designated as a FHC under GLBA.54 On
October 23, 2001, the staff of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland sent PNC a letter raising various accounting issues, and
requesting additional information regarding the formation of LLC
L5 Shortly before sending its response addressing only the LLC I
transaction, PNC informed the Reserve Bank that it had closed the
LLC III transaction.56
On January 11, 2002, the FRB directed PNC to consolidate
the transactions with the three LLCs on its BHC regulatory reports
for 2001 and on January 15, 2002, in a meeting with PNC's senior
management, the FRB staff explained the basis for the FRB's

FRB]; cf. Joint Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,
Fed. Res. Bd., Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency and Off. of Thrift Supervision,
Joint Interagency
Letter
to
Financial Institutions
(July
12, 1999),
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/99-65.doc (on file with N.C. Banking Institute)
(last visited Feb. 15, 2003) (announcing the issuance of a joint interagency letter to
financial institutions to provide the banking industry and accounting profession
guidance on the treatment of loan loss allowances). A BHC may be certified as a
FHC under GLBA if it has filed an election to be treated as a FHC and is wellmanaged, well-capitalized and its depository subsidiaries have ratings of satisfactory
or better under the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).
Bank Holding
Companies Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(1) (Supp. 2002); see supra note 2; infra note 59.
51. See PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE FRB, supra note 50, at 71.
52. Id. at 72.
53. Id.
54. LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK
FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES 2, available at http://library.law.unc.edu/bankinglaw
/chapter4.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2003); see supra note 2.
55. PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Enforcement Release No. 1597, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 175,112 at 63,486 (July 18, 2002).
56. Id.
OF THE
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directive and advised PNC that non-consolidation was
inappropriate. 7
In July 2002, the FRB and the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC) announced that the PNC holding company
and the bank were no longer in compliance with the FHC
standards set forth in GLBA. 5' The FRB said that PNC was no
longer "well-managed, 59 from an accounting and risk management
standpoint.6" Therefore, pursuant to GLBA, the FRB notified
PNC in writing that it was not in compliance with the applicable
requirements of a FHC.6 l
Once a company receives notice that it is not in
compliance, it has forty-five days to execute an agreement
acceptable to the FRB to comply with all applicable capital and
management requirements.62 The agreement must:
" Explain the specific actions that the company will take to
correct all areas of non-compliance;
" Provide a schedule within which each action will be taken;

57. Id; see PNC Press Release Announcing Revised 2001 Results, supra note 8.
58. See Rob Garver, Activist Agencies, Changing Market; How Regulators Turned
a Single Phrasefrom GLB Into Policy Lever, AM. BANKER, July 22, 2002, at 1.
59. Bank Holding Companies Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1)(B) (Supp. 2002);
Federal Reserve System Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 12
C.F.R. § 225.81(b)(2) (2002). A company or depository institution is well-managed
if, at its most recent examination or subsequent review by the appropriate federal
banking agency, the company receives (i) at least a satisfactory composite rating and
(ii) at least a satisfactory rating for management, if such a rating is given. 12 U.S.C. §
1843(l)(2); 12 C.F.R. § 225.82(d). If the company or depository institution has not
received an examination rating, the FRB may determine that the company or
institution is well-managed after reviewing the managerial and other resources of the
company and in consultation with the appropriate federal and state banking agencies.
12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(3); 12 C.F.R. § 225.82(d).
60. See Garver, supra note 58, at 1. GLBA has more or less objective
requirements for CRA and capital, but the determination of whether a BHC is "wellmanaged" is subjective and regulators have made it clear that accounting and risk
management are important factors in determining whether a BHC is "wellmanaged." Id. "Regulators have made it clear in recent months that responsibility
for accounting practices rests at the highest levels of bank management, and recent
actions at PNC ...make it clear that regulators view accounting problems as a sign of
management trouble." Id.
61. See PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Written Agreement, http://www.federalreserve.
gov/boarddocs/press/enforcement/2002/20020718/attachment.pdf
(F.R.B. July 12,
2002) (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
62. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m)(2); 12 C.F.R. § 225.83(c).
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" Provide any other information that the FRB may require;

and
* Be acceptable to the FRB.6 3
Until the FRB determines that the company has corrected the
conditions described in the notice, it may impose any limitations or
conditions on the conduct or activities of the company or any of its
affiliates that the FRB finds to be appropriate and consistent with
the purposes of the Bank Holding Companies Act.64 Additionally,
the company and its affiliates may not commence any additional
activities or acquire control or shares of any company without
prior approval of the FRB.65 If the company fails to correct the
unacceptable conditions within 180 days of receipt of the notice,
the FRB may require it to either divest ownership or control of
any depository institution owned or controlled by it, or cease to
engage in any financial activities not permitted for a BHC.6 6 PNC
is the first major U.S. institution to be threatened with the loss of
FHC status since the enactment of GLBA.67
PNC entered into a written agreement with the FRB that
severely restricts PNC's ability to enter into GLBA related
activities including management consulting services,68 providing
services to mutual funds, 69 and owning shares on the securities
exchange7 ° without regulatory approval.7' Under the agreement
with the FRB, PNC must engage a corporate consultant with the
approval of the FRB.72 The consultant will review the structure
and functioning of PNC's management and the manner in which

63.
64.
65.
66.

12 U.S.C. § 1843(m)(2); 12 C.F.R. § 225.83(c).
12 U.S.C. § 1843(m)(3); 12 C.F.R. § 225.83(d).
12 U.S.C. § 1843(m)(3); 12 C.F.R. § 225.83(d).
See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m)(4); 12 C.F.R. § 225.83(e). If PNC loses its FHC

status, it may have to divest some of its businesses such as those that relate to
providing services to mutual funds, owning shares of a securities exchange and
providing management consulting services. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m)(4); 12 C.F.R. §§
225.86(a)-(c).
67. Schmelkin & Garver, supra note 11, at 1.
68. See supra note 66.
69. Id.
70. Id.

71. See Schmelkin & Garver, supra note 11, at 1.
72. See PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Written Agreement, supra note 61, at 2.
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PNC's board of directors oversee management activities, and
provide a written report with recommendations.73
As a consequence of this agreement, PNC cannot amend or
rescind any approved plans, policies and procedures without prior
written approval of the FRB.74 Additionally, PNC is now required
to pay for deposit insurance, a benefit that is free to more than
ninety-two percent of U.S. banks at present.75 Finally, as a result
of the SEC action, various class action lawsuits have been brought
by PNC shareholders alleging that they had overpaid for PNC
stock because the price was based on inflated profits.76
In December 2002, PNC announced that it had met every
requirement laid out by the regulators under a 180-day supervisory
period set to expire in January of 2003."7 Some observers,
however, report that the imposition of the supervisory period has
resulted in "tremendous internal turmoil" that has distracted PNC
from its regular sales activities.7
IV.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION'S SCRUTINY OF

PNC's SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITY TRANSACTIONS
The SEC commenced administrative proceedings against
PNC alleging that PNC's accounting for the three SPE transactions
did not conform to GAAP.79 The SEC alleged that PNC
portrayed a false and misleading picture of its reduction of loan
portfolio exposure in its second and third quarter 10-Q forms and
attendant press releases.8 ° Further, the SEC claimed that PNC
73. Id. The company will also have to report regularly to the BHC supervisors
regarding the management's adherence to PNC's policies and procedures. Id. at 3.
74. See id.
75. Schmelkin & Garver, supra note 11, at 1.
76. Berzof, supra note 6, at Al.
77. See, Press Release, PNC Fin. Servs. Group, PNC in Full Compliance With
Financial Holding Company Requirements (Dec. 19, 2002), http://www.prnewswire.
com/gh/cnoc/comp/701257.html (on file with N.C. Banking Institute) (last visited Feb.
15, 2003).
78. Robert Julavits, PNC says Agency Demands All Met, Growth A Challenge,
AM. BANKER, Dec. 4, 2002, at 1 (quoting Richard X. Bove, a Hoefer & Arnett Inc.
analyst).
79. SEC Press Release, supra note 9.
80. PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Enforcement Release No. 1597, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 75,112 at 63,488 (July 18, 2002).
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offered and sold securities by means of registration statements that
incorporated the misleading 10-Q forms by reference, and the
prospectus presented an inaccurate picture of financial
performance." The SEC also alleged that PNC recklessly made
materially false and misleading disclosures in its January 17, 2002
press release concerning its financial condition.82 Finally, the SEC
stated that PNC failed to maintain accurate books and records
because it did not consolidate the assets transferred to the three
limited liability companies on its balance sheet, and thus its
balance sheet was inadequate.83
The SEC found that PNC's transactions with the SPEs did
not meet the GAAP provisions because of the structure of the
limited liability transactions." PNC intended to structure the
transaction so that it was the transferor to the SPE, and AIG was
the three percent third-party investor required by GAAP.85 The
SEC alleged, however, that PNC, and not AIG, had substantive
risks and rewards of ownership. 86 The SEC alleged that the
agreements for each of the LLC transactions provided that AIG's
investment was substantially protected from loss by the investment
grade assets to which AIG had priority in case of liquidation.87
Additionally, because the agreements provided that AIG would
have preference on reserves taken from the income of the LLCs to
secure payment of its management fees, the SEC contended that
this would result in AIG recouping its investment in the limited
liability entities in four years. 8 Further, AIG did not enjoy any
81. SEC Press Release, supra note 9.
82. Id.
83. See Id.

84. See PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Enforcement Release No. 1597, 7 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) T75,112 at 63,488.

85. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
86. PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Enforcement Release No. 1597, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) T75,112 at 63,488.

87. Id. AIG's cash contribution was used to purchase investment grade assets
and its Class B preferred stock was entitled to a variable dividend consisting of the
cash earnings of the investment grade securities purchased with its contribution. Id.
at 63,482.
88. Id. at 63,488. The SEC also contended that the fact that AIG received an
annual management fee of 0.75 percent of the assets for doing very little while PNC
conducted the principal activities of the entities by servicing the loans and other
assets they held for an annual servicing fee of 0.5 percent suggests that the annual
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gains from the loans and other assets transferred by PNC to the
entities because PNC had effective control over the liquidation of
the entities.89 PNC bore a substantial risk on the loans because the
dividends on its preferred stock were non-cumulative and payable
only if the loans performed or were sold and then only after
payment of, among other things, the management fees of AIG.90
Finally, the SEC contended that the requirement in the
LLC agreement that the management fee be paid at the time of
closing reduced AIG's actual investment to less than the three
percent required by EITF Topic No. D-14. 91 Thus, AIG's
investment in the LLCs was not substantive under GAAP. 92 The
SEC alleged that because the PNC transactions did not satisfy the
criteria for non-consolidation under GAAP, PNC should have
consolidated these entities in its financial statement.93
In its press release, PNC asserted that it had implemented a
corporate strategy of reducing its exposure to commercial lending
and the attendant risks. 94 The SPE transactions were a part of this
strategy, but PNC did not specifically mention these transactions
in either the press releases or the 10-Q forms.95 The SEC alleged,
however, that because of the way the SPE transactions were
structured, PNC continued to bear the risk of loss as to troubled or
non-performing loans and venture capital assets transferred by
PNC.96 The SEC did not bring criminal charges against PNC
management fee was a means of returning capital to AIG prior to liquidation of the
entities. Id. at 63,483.
89. Id. at 63,488.
90. Id.
91. Id; see supra text accompanying note 41.
92. PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Enforcement Release No. 1597, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) J75,112 at 63,488.
93. Id.
94. See Press Release, PNC Fin. Servs. Group, PNC Accelerates Strategic
Repositioning of Banking Businesses (Jan. 3, 2002), http://www.prnewswire.com/cgibin/micro-site.pl?Tick=PNC (on file with N.C. Banking Institute) (last visited Feb.
15, 2003).
95. PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Enforcement Release No. 1597, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 75,112 at 63,489; see also PNC's Second Quarter 10-Q Form, supra note 29.
96. PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Enforcement Release No. 1597, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 75,112 at 63,489. PNC's Class A preferred stock was non-cumulative,
nonvoting, and convertible. Id. at 63,482. While no Class A common stock was
issued at the time of closing, PNC could convert its Class A preferred stock at any
time into Class A common stock giving it 99.99 percent of the common shares. Id.
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because the case was a difference of opinion between the bank
regulators and PNC's accountants, and the SEC felt that "there
wasn't sufficient reason to impose penalties."9
Additionally,
"criminal sanctions are reserved for abusive treatment." 98 But
"[t]his was a case of a close-call accounting interpretation that is
very common.... [t]here was no attempt to defraud the public." 99
That is also probably why the SEC did not bring any sanctions
against AIG or PNC's auditors, Ernst & Young.
The SEC held that even if PNC thought that its accounting
for the SPEs was in accordance with GAAP, PNC was required to
evaluate the material accuracy and completeness of the
presentation made by its financial statements, as well as its
disclosure obligations under the SEC's rules and regulations.0°
GAAP also requires full and fair disclosure of the organization's
financial position and the results of the organization's operation.'0 '
Both PNC and Ernst & Young maintained that the SPEs
qualified for non-consolidation under GAAP.0 2 The SEC and
PNC agreed to settle the matter, and PNC consented to a cease
and desist order without admitting or denying the accounting

These shares, however, could only be used to cause an orderly liquidation of LLC I.
Id.
97. Berzof, supra note 6, at Al (quoting Leonard Wang, Assistant Director in the
SEC's enforcement division).
98. Id. (quoting Bill Strench, a securities attorney for Frost Brown Todd).
99. Id. (quoting Bill Strench, a securities attorney for Frost Brown Todd).
100. See In re Caterpillar Inc., 50 S.E.C. 903, 910 (1992) (finding that Caterpillar's
"Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Conditions and Results of
Operations" disclosures were deficient under Regulation S-K which requires
disclosure of information necessary to understand the registrant's financial
statements). But see Garver, supra note 58, at 1. Karen Shaw Petrou, the managing
partner with Federal Financial Analytics stated that,
The Securities and Exchange Commission "broke new ground that
must be frightening to all publicly traded, companies" by finding
that, even though PNC met generally accepted accounting
principles "and then still restated earnings, it had violated the
securities laws because the reports did not provide investors with a
full picture of the material risks to which the company was
subject."
Id.
101. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, EMP. & TRAINING ADMIN., WELFARE TO WORK
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE GUIDE 4-3 (1999), available at
http://wtw.doleta.gov/techassist/tag/ch04.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
102. See Berzof, supra note 6, at Al.

2003]

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

violations alleged by the SEC.10 3 Ernst & Young maintains that
PNC accounted for the SPEs appropriately."°4

The SEC's action "demonstrates that the [SEC] will closely
scrutinize transactions with special purpose entities," and "[p]ublic
companies engaged in transactions with special purpose entities

not only must rigorously comply with GAAP, but also must assure
that they accurately portray the material elements of the economic
risks and realities that they face as a result of these
transactions."''

5

PNC would not have faced any sanctions for not

disclosing the SPE transactions on its balance sheet if it had sold
the loans to companies in which it had no substantial financial

interest.106
V. LESSONS LEARNED FROM PNC

Transactions with SPEs are complex transactions, and the
accounting principles applied to PNC were not clear. Whether
PNC or AIG bore the risk of ownership of the SPEs is a matter of
opinion between PNC's accountants and the SEC." 7

PNC

interpretation of the GAAP rules was later second-guessed by the
FRB and the SEC."°

The rules for consolidation of SPEs are being re-examined
in the light of PNC, Enron and other concerns regarding the
103. See Press Release, PNC Fin. Servs. Group, PNC Announces Agreement With
Regulators (July 18, 2002), http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/micro-site.pl?
Tick=PNC (on file with N.C. Banking Institute) (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
104. Berzof, supra note 6, at Al. But see Stephen Taub, Working Both Sides of the
Street?, CFO MAGAZINE, Jan. 31, 2002, available at http://www.cfo.com/printarticle/
0,5317,6637,00.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2003) (positing that Ernst & Young's dual
role as PNC's auditor and AIG's accounting advisor presented a conflict of interest);
Melisa Allison, U.S. Sues Ernst for $2 billion FDIC accuses auditor of DuPage-based
Superior Bank of fraud and misconduct, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 2, 2002, at 1 (reporting a
lawsuit brought by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation alleging that Ernst &
Young had misstated a Chicago-based bank's assets and deliberately delayed
reporting of the error for fear that it would hurt an $11 billion sale of the accounting
firm's consulting division).
105. PNC Settles SEC Enforcement Action Over Treatment of $762M in Loans,
ANDREWS SEC. LITIG. & REG. REP. (July 31, 2002), WL 8 No. 4 ANSLRR 11
(quoting Stephen M. Cutler, the agency's enforcement director).
106. Berzof, supra note 6, at Al.
107. See supra notes 97 - 99 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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misuse of SPEs. 1°9 The Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB)" ° has issued a Proposed Interpretation of ARB No. 51."'
The proposal would apply to "any business enterprise that has an
ownership interest, contractual relationship or other involvement
with an SPE.""' 2
When one or more parties hold equity
investments that meet certain conditions, voting interests
determine whether consolidation is required, and provisions of the
proposed interpretation do not apply." 3 "An equity investment
shall be presumed to be insufficient to allow the SPE to finance its
activities without relying on financial support from variable
interest holders unless the investment is equal to at least [ten]
percent of the SPE's total assets."'".4 The American Accounting

109. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
110. Fin. Acct. Standards Bd., General Information, at http://www.fasb.org (last
visited Feb. 15, 2003). The mission of FASB is to establish standards of financial
accounting and reporting. Id.
111. FIN. Acr. STANDARDS BD., PROPOSED INTERPRETATION, CONSOLIDATION
OF CERTAIN SPECIAL-PURPOSE ENTITIES, AN INTERPRETATION OF ARB No. 51
(June 28, 2002) (on file N.C.
Banking Institute) [hereinafter PROPOSED
INTERPRETATION]. ARB No. 51 establishes the broad requirements for companies to
fully consolidate majority-owned subsidiaries. See AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB.
AccT., ACCOUNTING RESEARCH AND TERMINOLOGY BULLETIN: FINAL EDITION 41

(1961). Under the current version of ARB No. 51, the usual condition for a
controlling financial interest is ownership of a majority voting interest. See id.
112. PROPOSED INTERPRETATION, supra note 111, at 3. SPEs qualifying under
FASB Statement No. 140: Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets
and Extinguishment of Liabilities, and employee benefit plans subject to other FASB
provisions do not have to be consolidated. Id.
113. Id. at 4. These conditions are:
a. The nominal owner or owners have voting rights or similar
rights that convey the current ability to make decisions and
manage the SPE's activities to the extent they are not
predetermined by the establishing documents of the SPE or by
contracts or other arrangements.
b. The amount of the equity investment is sufficient to allow the
SPE to finance its activities without relying on financial support
from variable interest holders. ...
c. The equity investment .... is subject to loss ... and its return is
not limited or guaranteed ... by the SPE or other parties involved
with the SPE.
d. The assets exchanged for the equity interest are not
subordinated beneficial interests in another SPE ....
e. The equity investment was not provided directly or indirectly by
the SPE or other parties with variable interests ....
Id.
114. Id. at 5.
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Association's Financial Accounting Standards Committee warns
against specific quantitative guidance such as the ten percent
minimum level of equity investment to avoid the same
consequences as the three percent rule currently in effect." 5
Under the proposed interpretation, an SPE will be
consolidated with a business enterprise if the business enterprise
provides "significant financial support" to the SPE, and no other
party provides financial support to the SPE or if the business
enterprise provides the majority of or significant portion of the
total financial support to the SPE. l l 6 The proposed interpretation
identifies ways in which a business enterprise is deemed to have
provided financial support to the SPE, thus gaining a variable
interest in the SPE."7 These factors influencing consolidation
decisions should be reconsidered at each reporting date." 8 The
Financial Institutions Accounting Committee (FIAC) has
expressed concern that it will be almost impossible to implement
the variable interests approach in practice." 9 The FIAC contends
that it would be unrealistic to expect a variable interest holder to
determine whether they qualify under this interpretation for each

115. AM. Accr. Assoc. FIN. AccT. STANDARDS COMMITTEE, RESPONSE To FASB
EXPOSURE
DRAFT, PROPOSED INTERPRETATION: CONSOLIDATION OF CERTAIN
SPECIAL
PURPOSE
ENTITIES
8, http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aaa/about/

committee/fasc/Proposedlnterpretation.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2003) [hereinafter
AAA COMMENTS].
116. PROPOSED INTERPRETATION, supra note 111, at 5. The interpretation defines
variable interest as the interest through which an entity provides financial support to
the SPE, such as by holding a subordinate debt. Id. at 3. An entity that holds the
majority or a substantial majority of the variable interests in the SPE is the primary
beneficiary of the SPE, and is deemed to be the parent and is required to consolidate
the SPE. Id. at 3-4.
117. Id. at 7. Some of the ways in which a business enterprise is deemed to have
provided financial support are: (1) Its ownership interests do not amount to voting
interests; (2) It provides the SPE with subordinate debt, leases property to the SPE,
or guarantees debt or asset values; (3) It enters into management or service contracts,
referral agreements, purchase contracts, or options to acquire assets; (4) It provides
overcollateralization of assets to the SPE. Id.
118. Id. at 6.
119. FIN. INSTITUTIONS AccT. COMMITTEE, COMMENTS TO FASB EXPOSURE
DRAFT,

PROPOSED

PURPOSE ENTITIES,

INTERPRETATION:

CONSOLIDATION

OF

CERTAIN

SPECIAL

http://www.fmsinc.org/cms?pid=2437 (last visited Feb. 15, 2003)

[hereinafter FIAC COMMENTS]; see also AAA COMMENTS, supra note 115, at 5
(expressing concern that the guidelines provided by FASB defining variable interests
are unclear).
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reporting period. 2 ' The American Accounting Association's
Financial Accounting Standards Committee has suggested that the
FASB should adopt a principle-based approach that would require
disclosures that allow users to understand management's motives
for employing SPEs and their financial reporting choices rather
than a rule-based approach.' 2 '
The comment period for the proposed interpretation ended
on August 30, 2002.122 FASB issued the final interpretation in
January 2003.123 The effective date of the final interpretation will
be as of the fiscal periods beginning after June 15, 2003 for existing
entities. 124 Under the new interpretation, the assets, liabilities, and
non-controlling interests of newly consolidated SPEs would be
measured at carryover basis unless carryover basis is difficult to
determine, in which case the measurement would be at fair
25
value. 1
As the PNC issue has demonstrated, even if a FHC
complies with GAAP, bank regulators may require the FHC to
26
account for its transactions differently for its BHC reporting.1
This will result in the risk that the SEC will require greater
disclosure in financial statements in hindsight as it did in the case
of PNC.

127

A FHC that creates a SPE is also open to special risks
because it must comply with statutory requirements to maintain its
FHC status.2 8 In addition to an embarrassing reduction of
earnings and the enforcement action by the SEC, the Federal
Reserve Board as a FHC regulator has the power to substantially
alter the FHC's fundamental business model if the FHC does not
120. FIAC COMMENTS, supra note 119.

121. AAA COMMENTS, supra note 115, at 3. Disclosures should be such that
investors can assess the extent and nature of the risks and rewards of ownership. Id.
at 7.
122. PROPOSED INTERPRETATION, supra note 111.
123. FIN.
AcCT.
STANDARDS
BD., FASB INTERPRETATION
No.
46,
CONSOLIDATION OF VARIABLE INTEREST ENTITIES, AN INTERPRETATION OF ARB

No. 51, http://www.fasb.org/interp46.pdf (Jan. 2003) (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
124. See id. at 40.
125. Id.

126. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 79 - 106 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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return to compliance with FHC requirements and satisfy all other
FRB conditions within the required time period. 129 Additionally,
as in the case of PNC, a FHC may be open to lawsuit by investors
if it has to reduce earnings as a result of regulatory action. 30
Finally, as PNC demonstrated, even if the company returns to
compliance with the FHC requirements, it may be at the cost of its
focus on ongoing operations. 3 ' Therefore, FHCs may want to err
on the side of additional disclosures related to SPEs to ensure that
their decisions are not second-guessed at a later date by bank
regulators or the SEC.
The SEC wants more complete disclosure of off-balancesheet liabilities of banks and other companies. 132 Following Enron
and other ever-widening accounting scandals, banks have started
disclosing more details about their off-balance-sheet exposures on
their 10K filings. 133 Although the SEC does not insist on the
amount of detail now given by many banks in their 1OKs, it
encourages extensive disclosures.'34 This, however, creates greater
risk of regulatory action for FHCs that are not making additional
disclosures, because if some FHCs include more details about their
off-balance-sheet exposures on their W0Ks, the regulators would
eventually expect all FHCs to include similar disclosures. Finally,
GAAP and SEC Regulations require that companies make full
and fair disclosures to enable investors to make informed
decisions, and the SEC appears to be policing this issue more
135
stringently since the accounting scandals broke.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the use of SPEs is allowed under GAAP for offbalance-sheet securitization, companies, especially FHCs, should
129. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
132. Robert Lenzer, Timebombs in the Vault, FORBES, Feb. 18, 2002, at 58.
133. Alissa Schmelkin, PreferredIssues: Disclosure Up in lOKs, But What's It All
Mean?, AM. BANKER, March 18, 2002, at 9. Wachovia Corporation is taking the lead
in this area. Id.
134. Id.
135. See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
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be careful about the way these transactions are structured to
ensure that they do not run afoul of the SEC or the FRB. 136 If the
FRB determines that a FHC is not in compliance with GAAP, it
may take action against the institution and severely restrict the
institution's ability to continue activities as a FHC. 137 As the PNC
situation illustrates, the FRB can take action even if it is simply a
matter of opinion whether a transaction is in accordance with
GAAP. 138 Additionally, it is unclear whether the SEC would have
taken action against PNC if the FRB had not raised the issue of its
accounting for the SPEs. 139 Therefore, the actions that the FRB
takes against financial institutions may also lead to action by other
regulatory bodies including the SEC.
The SEC has made it clear that it will scrutinize
40
transactions involving SPEs very closely in the post-Enron era.'
For example, PNC arguably had complied with GAAP in
structuring the LLCs.14 1 It remains to be seen whether the SEC
will also take action in other areas of accounting where there is a
difference of opinion between the SEC and companies and their
auditors on how to account for certain transactions. Additionally,
the impact of the various accounting rule changes is not yet
known.
Financial institutions must ensure that if they create SPEs
for off-balance-sheet transactions, an independent third party
should own at least three percent of the SPE (ten percent under
the new interpretation). 42 Additionally, the financial institution
should not be the entity bearing the risks and rewards of
ownership of the SPE. 143 Finally, the financial institution should
have minimal or no control of the SPE.' 44 The new interpretation

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See, e.g., Garver, supra note 58, at 1; see also supra note 100.
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 55-58, 79 and accompanying text.
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.

141. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 41 and 114 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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of ARB No. 51 will likely clarify some confusion regarding the
accounting for SPEs.145

Generally, in all accounting issues, even if companies
account for their transactions in accordance with GAAP, they
should ensure that they make adequate disclosures on their
financial statements so that investors can make informed
decisions.146 This may mean that companies, especially FHCs,
should disclose all transactions that may later be questioned by
either the bank regulators or by the SEC, to avoid allegations that
the company has failed to accurately portray its financial position.
It is fair to assume that the SEC will take action against a company
if it determines that the company is attempting to deceive
investors by not disclosing all relevant information about the
company's economic condition.
JOYITA

145. See supra notes 111-121 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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